import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:typed_data';

import 'package:block2_spike/block2_spike.dart';
import 'package:test/test.dart';

/// Q3 (hardest piece) — NIP-17 private messaging: does the gift-wrap flow work
/// end to end, stay unreadable to the relay, and hide the sender's identity?
void main() {
  NostrKey keyFor(int fill) =>
      NostrKey.deriveFromSeed(Uint8List(32)..fillRange(0, 32, fill));

  group('NIP-44 encryption', () {
    test('conversation key is symmetric (A→B == B→A)', () {
      final a = keyFor(1);
      final b = keyFor(2);
      final ab = Nip44.conversationKey(a.privateKeyHex, b.publicKeyHex);
      final ba = Nip44.conversationKey(b.privateKeyHex, a.publicKeyHex);
      expect(ab, ba);
    });

    test('round-trips text, and a wrong key cannot decrypt', () {
      final a = keyFor(1);
      final b = keyFor(2);
      final eve = keyFor(9);
      final key = Nip44.conversationKey(a.privateKeyHex, b.publicKeyHex);
      final payload = Nip44.encrypt(key, 'tengo tomate rosa, ¿te va bien?');
      expect(Nip44.decrypt(key, payload), 'tengo tomate rosa, ¿te va bien?');

      final eveKey = Nip44.conversationKey(eve.privateKeyHex, b.publicKeyHex);
      expect(() => Nip44.decrypt(eveKey, payload), throwsFormatException);
    });

    test('ciphertext length hides the exact plaintext length (padding)', () {
      final a = keyFor(1);
      final b = keyFor(2);
      final key = Nip44.conversationKey(a.privateKeyHex, b.publicKeyHex);
      final short = base64.decode(Nip44.encrypt(key, 'hi')).length;
      final alsoShort = base64.decode(Nip44.encrypt(key, 'hello!')).length;
      // Both pad to the same 32-byte bucket → equal payload sizes.
      expect(short, alsoShort);
    });
  });

  group('NIP-17 gift-wrapped DM over the relay', () {
    late MiniRelay relay;
    setUp(() async => relay = await MiniRelay.start());
    tearDown(() async => relay.stop());

    test('Alice → Bob: message arrives, sender is authenticated', () async {
      final alice = keyFor(1);
      final bob = keyFor(2);

      final aliceConn = await NostrConnection.connect(
        relay.url,
        privateKeyHex: alice.privateKeyHex,
        publicKeyHex: alice.publicKeyHex,
      );
      final bobConn = await NostrConnection.connect(
        relay.url,
        privateKeyHex: bob.privateKeyHex,
        publicKeyHex: bob.publicKeyHex,
      );
      final aliceMsg = NostrMessageTransport(aliceConn);
      final bobMsg = NostrMessageTransport(bobConn);

      await aliceMsg.send(
        toPubkey: bob.publicKeyHex,
        text: '¿cambiamos semilla de calabaza?',
      );

      final inbox = await bobMsg.inboxUntilEose();
      expect(inbox, hasLength(1));
      expect(inbox.single.text, '¿cambiamos semilla de calabaza?');
      // Authenticated as Alice, even though the wrap was signed by an ephemeral.
      expect(inbox.single.fromPubkey, alice.publicKeyHex);

      await aliceMsg.close();
      await bobMsg.close();
    });

    test('the relay/eavesdropper sees neither plaintext nor the real sender',
        () async {
      final alice = keyFor(1);
      final bob = keyFor(2);
      final aliceConn = await NostrConnection.connect(
        relay.url,
        privateKeyHex: alice.privateKeyHex,
        publicKeyHex: alice.publicKeyHex,
      );
      await NostrMessageTransport(aliceConn).send(
        toPubkey: bob.publicKeyHex,
        text: 'SECRET-PLAINTEXT-MARKER',
      );

      // Snoop the relay's stored events directly (as a relay operator would).
      final snoop = await NostrConnection.connect(
        relay.url,
        privateKeyHex: keyFor(7).privateKeyHex,
        publicKeyHex: keyFor(7).publicKeyHex,
      );
      final wraps = await snoop.reqOnce({'kinds': [1059]});
      expect(wraps, hasLength(1));
      final wire = jsonEncode(wraps.single.toJson());
      expect(wire, isNot(contains('SECRET-PLAINTEXT-MARKER')));
      // The wrap's author is the ephemeral key, NOT Alice.
      expect(wraps.single.pubkey, isNot(alice.publicKeyHex));
      // Only the recipient is addressable (the `p` tag), never the sender.
      expect(wraps.single.tag('p'), bob.publicKeyHex);

      await aliceConn.close();
      await snoop.close();
    });

    test('a third party cannot unwrap a message not addressed to them',
        () async {
      final alice = keyFor(1);
      final bob = keyFor(2);
      final mallory = keyFor(5);
      final aliceConn = await NostrConnection.connect(
        relay.url,
        privateKeyHex: alice.privateKeyHex,
        publicKeyHex: alice.publicKeyHex,
      );
      await NostrMessageTransport(aliceConn).send(
        toPubkey: bob.publicKeyHex,
        text: 'solo para Bob',
      );
      // Mallory subscribes to 1059 with no p-filter and tries to unwrap.
      final malloryConn = await NostrConnection.connect(
        relay.url,
        privateKeyHex: mallory.privateKeyHex,
        publicKeyHex: mallory.publicKeyHex,
      );
      final malloryMsg = NostrMessageTransport(malloryConn);
      final got = await malloryMsg.inboxUntilEose();
      // Her inbox filters on her own `p` tag, so the relay never even hands her
      // Bob's wrap; and the eavesdropper test proves that even raw snooping
      // yields only ciphertext. Two layers, same outcome: she sees nothing.
      expect(got, isEmpty, reason: 'not addressed to Mallory (p-tag scoping)');

      await aliceConn.close();
      await malloryConn.close();
    });
  });
}